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The First Amendment Does Not Require Schools to
Tolerate Student Expression That Contributes to
the Dangers of Illegal Drug Use: Morse v. Frederick
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF
SPEECH - The United States Supreme Court held that a student's
right to free speech was not violated when a banner which he dis-
played at a school event was confiscated by his principal because
she reasonably believed that it promoted illegal drug use.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
The Olympic Torch Relay for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games
in Salt Lake City, Utah was anticipated to pass through Juneau,
Alaska on January 24, 2002.1 As part of one of the segments of
the procession, the torchbearers planned on running in front of
Juneau-Douglas High School (JDHS).2 The students and staff
were permitted to leave the school and observe the relay from both
sides of the street by the petitioner, Deborah Morse, the JDHS
principal. 3 Morse deemed the torch relay observation an approved
social event or class trip during which the students' behavior was
supervised by teachers and administrative officials.
4
Respondent, Joseph Frederick, a JDHS senior, was absent from
school the morning of January 24, 2002, because of a snowstorm.
5
However, he arrived near JDHS shortly before the torch relay
passed the school. 6 Upon arriving and before entering JDHS, Fre-
derick joined several of his friends on the sidewalk across the
street from the school to wait for the torch relay. 7 There was some
mayhem among the students before the torch passed, as evidenced
by students throwing plastic cola bottles, tossing snowballs, and
1. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
2. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit charac-
terizes Frederick's tardiness as "never making it to school that morning." Frederick, 439
F.3d at 1115. The United States Supreme Court, in its presentation of the facts of the case,
simply reported that Frederick was late to school the day of the incident resulting in the
claim. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622
6. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
7. Id.
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fighting with each other.8 Frederick and his group did not par-
ticipate in this disorder. 9  Instead, they waited until the
torchbearers and camera crews passed by and then unfurled a
fourteen-foot banner which displayed the phrase "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS."1o The students on the other side of the street were able
to read the banner, and Morse immediately crossed the street and
directed Frederick and his group to take down the banner.11
Everyone followed the direction except Frederick, who asked
Morse about his rights under the United States Constitution.12
Morse later informed Frederick that the banner violated the
JDHS policy against displaying offensive material, including ma-
terial that advertises or promotes the use of illegal drugs. 13 Morse
then took the banner and crumpled it up. 
14
After Morse confiscated the banner, she instructed Frederick to
report to her office. 15 While in Morse's office, Frederick refused to
divulge the names of the other students who were holding up the
banner.16 Frederick also claimed that Morse suspended him for
five days, but increased his suspension to ten days after he quoted
Thomas Jefferson on the freedom of expression. 17
Frederick utilized the administrative appeals process available
to him through the school district to dispute the suspension.18
The superintendent upheld the suspension, but limited it to time
served, or eight days.19 Frederick appealed the superintendent's
decision to the Juneau School District Board of Education, which
also upheld the suspension. 20
8. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1115-16.
9. Id.
10. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
11. Id.
12. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622.
16. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116.
17. Id.
18. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2623.
19. Id. In a memorandum explaining his reasons for upholding the suspension, the
superintendent noted that Frederick had displayed the banner at a school-sponsored event
during school hours and in the presence of other students. Id. He also added that Freder-
ick was not suspended because the principal of the school "disagreed" with his speech, but
because the banner appeared to promote illegal drug use. Id. Finally, the superintendent
concluded that the principal's actions were permitted because displaying the banner inter-
fered with the work of the school. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Frederick filed his action in the United States District Court for the District of
Alaska. Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *2 (D. Alaska
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Frederick, claiming that his First Amendment rights were vio-
lated by the principal and school board, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. 21 In her answers
to interrogatories, Morse never contended that the display of the
banner disrupted or could have disrupted classroom work.22
Rather, Morse argued that the banner interfered with the educa-
tional process because it could have been construed as advocating
illegal drug use, which was inconsistent with the school district's
mission to promote a healthy, drug-free lifestyle. 23 Morse also
indicated that failure to address the display of the banner would
have given the impression that the district approved of the mes-
sage. 24 If this impression were realized, Morse feared it would
result in further inconsistencies with the district's obligation to
teach the students socially appropriate behavior. 25
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska
granted summary judgment for Morse and held that she was enti-
tled to qualified immunity. 26 Additionally, the district court found
that Morse had not violated Frederick's First Amendment rights
because, in confiscating the banner, Morse reasonably perceived
the banner's message as promoting illegal drug use and in direct
contradiction of the JDHS's policy involving the prevention of drug
abuse. 27
Frederick appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Morse was not entitled to
May 27, 2003). The relevant portion of The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), in-
structs that:
[Elvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.




26. Frederick v. Morse, No. J 02-008 CV(JWS), 2003 WL 25274689, at *2 (D. Alaska
May 29, 2003). Government officials performing discretionary functions are given qualified
immunity and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36a-38a, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007)
(No. 06-278).
28. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1123.
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qualified immunity and that Frederick's First Amendment rights
were violated when his banner was confiscated and when he was
subsequently punished for displaying it.28 The court of appeals
reasoned that Frederick's punishment for displaying his banner
should be reviewed under the standard set forth in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,29 which required
the speech in question to cause the likelihood of a substantial dis-
ruption to a school's educational mission to justify the censorship
and punishment of such speech. 30 In reaching its holding, the
court noted Morse's admission that the sole reason for banning
Frederick's speech was because it conflicted with the school's ob-
jective of discouraging drug use. 31 The court, therefore, held that
Morse's reason failed to meet the standard outlined in Tinker.
32
Additionally, the defense of qualified immunity was rejected be-
cause, in the court's opinion, Frederick's constitutional right to
display the banner was so obviously established that a reasonable
principal in Morse's position would have understood that her ac-
tions were unconstitutional. 33
Frederick appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari on two questions. 34 The first was whether Fre-
derick had a First Amendment right to display his banner. 35 The
second was whether this right was so clearly established that
Morse could be held liable for damages. 36 Because the majority
resolved the first question against Frederick, they found no need
to address the second.
37
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, began his analy-
sis by addressing Frederick's argument that this was not a school
speech case. 38 Frederick argued that since the students were re-
leased from school that day to watch a private event, parental
permission slips were not required for release from the school for
the event (as was the routine for field trips and other supervised
29. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
30. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1123.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1123-25.
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events off the school premises), and the banner display was off of
school property, Frederick's speech was not made at school.39 As
support for Frederick's argument, other students filed affidavits
which indicated that they were simply released from school, not
required to stay with the school group or with their teachers, and
were not stopped from leaving.40 However, Chief Justice Roberts
rejected Frederick's argument that this was not a school speech
case, considering that the event had occurred during normal
school hours, was approved by the principal, was supervised by
teachers and administrators, and was accompanied by the per-
formance of the high school band and cheerleaders.
41
The opinion proceeded to declare that dismissing the banner as
meaningless and funny, as contended by Frederick, would ignore
its unquestionable reference to the promotion of illegal drugs.
42
Correspondingly, the Court narrowed the question to whether a
principal may restrict speech at a school event when that speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting drug use.
43
The Court referenced Tinker,44 which held that student speech
may not be restricted by school officials unless it is reasonably
perceived as significantly disrupting the work and discipline of the
school. 45 The majority then examined Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser,46 a case which involved the suspension of a student
for delivering a high school assembly speech which included a
sexually graphic metaphor. 47 Although the method of analysis in
Fraser was not entirely clear, two basic principles were extracted
from it.48 First, the constitutional rights of students in public
39. Frederick, 439 F.3d at 1116.
40. Id.
41. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22-23, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 06-278). Fur-
thermore, the Court agreed with the superintendent's assertion that Frederick could not
"stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activ-
ity and claim he is not at school." Id. at 63a.
42. Morse, 127 at 2625. The majority suggested that the words on the banner could be
interpreted as an imperative ("take bong hits") or as celebrating drug use ("bong hits are a
good thing" or "we take bong hits"). Id.
43. Id.
44. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The court in Tinker also recognized that if the only interest a
school identifies in restricting political speech is to avoid the discomfort associated with an
unpopular viewpoint, then that interest is not enough to justify the banning of a silent and
passive expression of opinion. Id. at 509 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 ("a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular view-
point")).
45. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514).
46. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
47. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678).
48. Id.
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schools are not necessarily the same as those of adults in other
situations. 49 Second, Tinker's method of analysis is not absolute
in that the Fraser court did not conduct the substantial disruption
test prescribed by Tinker.
50
Morse encouraged the Court to apply the broader rule from Fra-
ser and to conclude that Frederick's speech could be banned be-
cause it was "offensive," as the term was used in Fraser.51 The
majority believed that this would extend the Fraser standard too
far and that Fraser should not be interpreted to include all speech
that falls under the definition of "offensive."52 Additionally, the
Court noted that the issue was whether the speech could be rea-
sonably perceived as promoting illegal drug use, not whether it
was offensive. 53
Chief Justice Robert's analysis also recognized the principle that
even though children do not lose their constitutional rights in
school, such rights are characterized by what is appropriate for
children while in school. 54 Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts ac-
knowledged the compelling interest that a school has in deterring
drug use by schoolchildren. 55 The majority noted that Congress
required that schools that receive funds under the Safe and Drug-
Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 confirm that their drug
prevention programs communicate an authoritative message that
using illegal drugs is wrong and harmful. 56 Additionally, Con-
gress instructed that it is a part of a school's job to educate stu-
dents about the dangers of illegal drugs.
57
The Court's conclusion that schools should be allowed to restrict
student speech reasonably perceived to be promoting illicit drug
use was supported by the interest of government in curbing drug
abuse by students in school and the special qualities of the school
environment.58 Because this distinct concern of preventing drug
abuse was included in JDHS's school policy, the majority deter-
49. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
50. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 676).
51. Id. at 2629.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2627 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995)).
55. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628.
56. Id. (quoting Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, 20 U.S.C. §
7114(d)(6) (Supp. IV 2004)).
57. Id.




mined that Morse's restriction of Frederick's speech extended be-
yond a simple desire to circumvent controversy.
59
Considering the determination that Frederick's banner consti-
tuted the promotion of illegal drug use, the unique characteristics
of the school environment, and the distinct interest a school has in
discouraging illegal drug abuse, the majority finalized its opinion
by proclaiming that the First Amendment did not require schools
to tolerate student expression at school events that contributed to
the dangers of illegal drug use. 60
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. 61 In his opinion,
Justice Thomas stated that the rule of law established in Tinker is
without Constitutional basis.62 In his opinion, the original under-
standing of the First Amendment did not protect student speech
in public schools. 63 Justice Thomas reasoned that if students were
originally understood to have First Amendment rights in public
schools, these rights would have been respected and enforced in
public schools in the nineteenth century.
64
However, Justice Thomas noted that these rights were not en-
forced. 65 Therefore, Justice Thomas placed significant emphasis
on the doctrine of in loco parentis.66 According to Justice Thomas,
the doctrine only prevented schools in the nineteenth century from
imposing excessive physical punishment on the student; other-
wise, there were no limits on the school's ability to set rules and
control their classrooms. 67 Consequently, courts frequently pre-
served the rights of teachers to restrict speech that they thought
was not in accordance with the school's educational goals.68 Jus-
tice Thomas concluded by noting that Tinker utterly ignored this
60. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
61. Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 2630.
63. Id. Justice Thomas noted that the Court has previously observed that "the First
Amendment was not originally understood to permit all sorts of speech; instead '[tihere are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." Id. (quoting Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
64. Id.
65. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2630 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 2631. In loco parentis allowed a parent to delegate part of their authority to
the school and give it the same power as the parent with regard to restraint and correction.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 453.
67. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2633 (Thomas, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2632.
69. Id. at 2636.
70. Id. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
Spring 2008 527
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history of public education; thus he could not accept the law that it
established. 69
Justice Alito filed a separate concurring opinion, which Justice
Kennedy joined. 70 He advised that the better approach would be
to dispense with Tinker altogether instead of adding another ex-
ception to it, as he believed the majority had done. 71 Justice Alito
rejected Justice Thomas's contention that public school officials,
for First Amendment issues, should be treated as if they were pri-
vate actors standing in loco parentis. 72 He recognized that most
parents have no choice but to send their children to public schools
and that parents have little influence on what occurs in those
schools. 73 Because of this, any argument for changing the usual
rules of free speech must be rooted in the uniqueness of the school
environment and not in a theory of delegation. 74 In Justice Alito's
opinion, that special characteristic in this case was the threat to
the physical safety of the students.75 Because illegal drug use
poses a threat to student safety, schools should be able to restrict
speech promoting it.76 However, Justice Alito warned that such
regulation stands at the "far reaches of what the First Amend-
ment permits. '
77
Justice Breyer issued an opinion which concurred in part and
dissented in part, arguing that the Court should effectively end
the dispute by deciding that Frederick's claim for monetary dam-
ages was prohibited by qualified immunity.78 He contended that
the Court should adhere to the basic constitutional obligation of
avoiding unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions. 79 He
proposed that this could be done through the application of quali-
fied immunity which he believed was appropriate in this case.80
Its appropriateness lies in the fact that Morse's actions when deal-
ing with Frederick were not in plain violation of the law. 81
71. Id.
72. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 2637.
74. Id. at 2638.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638 (Alito, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2638-43 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 2639-40.
80. Id. at 2640.
81. Id.
82. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2642 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2642-43.
528 Vol. 46
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However, Justice Breyer recognized that Frederick initially
sought an injunction in addition to damages and that a qualified
immunity defense does not apply to requests for injunctive relief.
82
Thus, the constitutional question would apparently still remain.83
Justice Breyer, however, seriously doubted whether the constitu-
tional question, in actuality, remained because the superinten-
dent, in reducing the suspension of Frederick, noted that several
actions independent of Frederick's speech supported the suspen-
sion.8 4 The superintendent wrote that even if the school were to
concede that Frederick's speech was protected, the remainder of
his behavior was inexcusable.8 5 In essence, the school board's re-
fusal to erase the suspension from Frederick's record could be jus-
tified on grounds not related to speech and would not require the
Court to resolve the constitutional question.
8 6
Justice Stevens dissented and was joined by Justice Souter and
Justice Ginsburg.8 7 He agreed with the majority that Morse
should not be held liable for pulling down Frederick's banner;
however, the school's interest in protecting its students from
speech reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug use does
not justify suspending Frederick for making an ambiguous state-
ment in front of television cameras simply because it made an in-
direct reference to drugs.
88
The dissent argued that the First Amendment protects student
speech as long as it does not violate a school policy or explicitly
advocate conduct which is illegal or harmful to students.8 9 Justice
Stevens claimed that Frederick's expression, which Stevens char-
acterized as a "nonsense banner," did neither. 90 Consequently, the
majority, by upholding a school's decision to punish Frederick for




87. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2643. Justice Stevens further added that "the First Amendment demands
more, indeed, much more." Id.
89. Id. at 2644.
90. Id.
91. Id. Justice Stevens opined: "This nonsense banner [neither violates a permissible
rule nor expressly advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to students], and the Court
does serious violence to the First Amendment in upholding-indeed, lauding-a school's
decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it disagreed." Id.
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The United States Supreme Court has long held that students
and teachers do not surrender their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech upon entering the schoolhouse. 92 This principle
was reflected in Board of Education v. Barnette,93 when the Court
concluded that, under the First Amendment, a student in a public
school could not be compelled to salute the flag. 94 On the other
hand, the Court has recognized the need to support State and
school authority to control the conduct of students in school as
long as such authority is consistent with constitutional rights.
95
The problem inherent in the collision between the exercise of a
student's First Amendment rights and the policies and rules of a
school was comprehensively dealt with in Tinker.96 In Tinker, the
Court concluded that a school could not prohibit student expres-
sion simply because it wanted to avoid the controversy which
could result from that expression. 97 Based on this conclusion, the
Court held that a school can only prohibit student expression if
the particular expression would cause a significant disruption in
and interference with the operation of the school.98
In Tinker, a group of adults and students in Des Moines wanted
to express their displeasure with the Vietnam War and their sup-
port for a truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday
season of 1965. 99 The principals of the Des Moines schools were
informed of the plan and created a policy to deal with students
wearing armbands to school. 100 The policy instructed that any
students wearing an armband to school would be requested to re-
move it; if they refused, they would be suspended until they re-
turned to school without the armband. '0 '
92. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
93. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
94. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637-38. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, indicated:
[Boards of Education] have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discre-
tionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights. That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount impor-
tant principles of our government as mere platitudes.
Id. at 637.
95. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
96. 393 U.S. 503, 507.
97. Id. at 509.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 504.
100. Id.
101. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
530 Vol. 46
Morse v. Frederick
Two days after the policy was put in place, John Tinker wore his
armband to school. 10 2 Consequently, he was sent home and sus-
pended from school until he would come back without the arm-
band. 0 3 Tinker returned to school after New Year's Day. 104
Tinker, through his father, filed a complaint with the United
States District Court, under Section 1983, seeking nominal dam-
ages and an injunction preventing the school officials and board of
directors from disciplining him. 10 5 The district court dismissed
the complaint and held that the school's actions were a reasonable
attempt to prevent disruption to discipline in the school and were
therefore constitutional. 106 Tinker appealed, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eight Circuit, without written opinion, affirmed the
district court's decision. '0
7
Tinker then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari. 108 Justice Fortas, writing for the major-
ity, began his opinion by noting that First Amendment rights are
available to students and teachers while in school.' 0 9 In support
of this, Justice Fortas emphasized the longstanding holding of the
Court that neither students nor teachers abandon their freedom of
speech rights upon entering the schoolhouse. 110 However, these
rights are considered with regard to the special characteristics of
the school environment."'
Justice Fortas proceeded to identify the problem in this case as
existing in the area where the policies of school officials conflict
with students exercising their First Amendment rights. 112 Addi-
tionally, Justice Fortas recognized that this case was not one
which concerned expression that interfered with the school's work
or other students' rights. 113 Referencing the district court's con-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Tinker returned to school after the period planned by the adults and students
for their protest of the Vietnam War expired. Id.
105. Id. at 504.
106. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. The district court specifically declined to follow a holding
by the Fifth Circuit in a similar case which instructed that the wearing of symbols as a
form of expression could not be prohibited unless it "materially and substantially inter-
fere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Id.
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
107. Id. at 505.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 506.
110. Id.
111. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506
112. Id. at 509.
113. Id. at 508. The majority did note that outside the classrooms, Tinker was con-
fronted with hostile remarks by a few other students. Id. However, the Court still con-
Spring 2008
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clusion that the school's actions were reasonable because they
were rooted in its anxiety surrounding the potential disruption
that the armbands could have created, the Court admitted that
any student nonconformity may cause trouble or inspire fear. 114
However, the Court noted that this apprehension is not enough
to sacrifice the guarantees of the First Amendment. 115 There
must be something more than the desire to avoid the discomfort
that often accompanies an unpopular opinion to justify a school's
restriction on a particular type of expression. 116 That something
must rise to the level of presenting a threat of creating significant
interference with the administration of discipline in the school."
7
The Court's examination of the record uncovered no evidence
which could support the conclusion that there was a substantial
threat of interference with the discipline of the school or the rights
of the other students. 118 On the contrary, the Court
found that the primary reason for the disputed regulation was
to avoid controversy. 119 Before issuing its decision, the majority
emphasized that state-operated schools could not institute or en-
force policies and rules that result in a totalitarian environ-
ment.120 Additionally, students in school, as well as out of school,
are persons under the Constitution and have fundamental rights
cluded that there was no intrusion on the work of the school or rights of the other students
because Tinker's expression was silent and passive and there were no threats or acts of
violence on school premises toward him. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 508. Justice Fortas opined:
[A]ny departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation
from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person
may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take the risk and our history says that this sort of hazardous freedom-
this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the inde-
pendence and vigor of Americans who grow up to live in this relatively permis-
sive, often disputatious, society.
Id. at 508-09.
116. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 509.
119. Id. at 510. There was evidence in the record that the disputed regulation was the
product of the school authorities' recognition of the Vietnam War as a source of heated
debate in many areas of the United States, as evidenced by protest marches in Washington,
D.C. and several draft card burning cases which were pending in the Court. Id. The major-
ity also believed it was relevant that other forms of political expression, including the wear-
ing of buttons supporting national political campaigns and the display of the Nazi Iron
Cross, were not banned in some of the schools in the district. Id.
120. Id.at511.
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which schools must respect. 121 Unless there is a constitutionally
permissible reason for restricting those rights, students are al-
lowed to express their views. 122 In Tinker, the constitutionally
permissible reason for restricting the rights of freedom of expres-
sion was determined to be a threat that the expression would have
caused a substantial disruption or material interference with
school discipline. 123 Because the Court could find no evidence in
the record to support that this threat existed, it concluded that the
regulation prohibiting the wearing of the armbands was an uncon-
stitutional denial of Tinker's right of expression. 124
The United States Supreme Court confronted a similar issue re-
lated to the First Amendment rights of students while in school in
Fraser v. Bethel School District No. 403.125 In Fraser, the Court
examined whether a school district was prohibited by the First
Amendment from suspending a high school student for giving a
lewd speech during a school assembly. 126 Noting that the view-
points expressed by the student were not political in nature, the
majority held the First Amendment does not prevent a school from
suspending a student for vulgar and lewd speech after it was de-
termined by the school officials that such speech would adversely
affect its educational mission. 12
7
The events that resulted in the Court's holding began when
Matthew Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in the state of
Washington, gave a speech nominating a fellow student for repre-
sentation of the student body. 128 The speech was given during an
assembly which was part of a school-sponsored program in self-
government. 129 In attendance at the assembly were approxi-
mately six hundred high school students, many of whom were age
fourteen. 130
Before giving his presentation, Fraser discussed the contents of
his speech with two of his teachers who subsequently warned him
of the possibility of dire consequences for giving such a speech.131
Despite this warning, Fraser delivered the speech and throughout
121. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 513.
124. Id. at 514.
125. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
126. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 676.
127. Id. at 685.
128. Id. at 677-78.
129. Id. at 677.
130. Id.
131. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678.
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it, referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate sexual meta-
phor. 1
32
The following day, the Assistant Principal called Fraser into his
office and informed him that his speech was in violation of the
school's disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene lan-
guage. 133 Fraser conceded that he gave the speech as described in
five letters submitted to the Assistant Principal by teachers who
had witnessed the event. 134 He also admitted that he had pur-
posely used sexually suggestive language in the speech. 135 In re-
sponse to these concessions, the Assistant Principal suspended
him for three days and informed him that he was not eligible to be
considered as a graduation speaker at the school's commence-
ment. 13
6
Fraser utilized the school district's grievance procedures and
requested review of the suspension. 137 The hearing officer af-
firmed the suspension. 138 After serving two days of his suspen-
sion, Fraser was allowed to return to school. 139
Fraser brought an action in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington alleging a violation of his
right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. 140 The
district court held that the school's rule prohibiting the use of ob-
scene language was unconstitutionally vague and broad and that
the suspension of Fraser violated his freedom of speech rights un-
der the United States Constitution. 141
The school appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.142 The school
132. Id. at 677-78. During Fraser's delivery of the speech, school personnel observed
students in the audience becoming unruly in response to the sexual nature of the speech.
Id. at 678. The students "hooted and yelled" and made sexual gestures characterizing the
activities alluded to in Fraser's speech. Id. Other students appeared to become embar-
rassed and confused in response to the speech. Id.
133. Id at 678. The relevant Bethel High School disciplinary rule warned that: "Conduct
which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited,
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678.
137. Id. at 678.
138. Id. at 679.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
142. Id. The court of appeals held that the expression in this case was indistinguishable
from the expression in Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and specifically refused
to accept the school's contention that Fraser's speech, unlike the armbands worn in protest
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then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari. 143 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, began
his opinion by noting the lack of significance given by the court of
appeals to the substantial distinction between the political mes-
sage of the protest armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of
Fraser's speech in this case. 144 He also believed it was appropriate
to analyze the amount of First Amendment protection that should
be given to Fraser's speech against the background established in
Tinker.145 This background was characterized by the Court in
Tinker taking special care to note that the case did not involve
expression that intruded upon the school's work or other student's
rights. 146
Justice Blackmun recognized that schools have an interest in
shielding minors from exposure to sexually explicit expression.
147
Additionally, the majority stressed that the role of schools in the
United States in shaping the minds of students is not limited to
education through textbooks and lecture. 148 That role also in-
cludes teaching the values of a civilized social order by example.
149
Consequently, both teachers and older students must accept the
responsibility of role models and demonstrate the appropriate
form of civil discourse.150 Based on this reasoning, the Court con-
cluded that it is legitimate for a school to determine that mature
civil conduct and political expression are not demonstrated by tol-
erating the expression of lewd, offensive speech. 151 Accordingly,
the Court held that an appropriate function of school policy and
regulations is to limit lewd and vulgar expression that is opposed
to the "fundamental values" inherent in public school education. 152
A violation of First Amendment rights was also asserted by stu-
dent staff members of a high school newspaper in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier.153 The issue in Kuhlmeier was to
of the Vietnam War in Tinker, resulted in disruption in the educational process. Fraser,
478 U.S. at 679.
143. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
144. Id. at 680.
145. Id. at 681.
146. Id. at 680.
147. Id. at 684.
148. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 685.
152. Id.
153. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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what extent a school could assume editorial control over a school-
sponsored newspaper. 154 The Court answered this by holding that
a school could exercise editorial control over the content of student
speech in school-sponsored activities without violating the First
Amendment as long as the school's actions were reasonably re-
lated to its educational mission. 155 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice White, however, recognized the limited applicability of both
Tinker and Fraser, since the standards set forth in those cases did
not extend to articles included in a school-sponsored newspaper. 1
56
The majority in Morse recognized the limited application of
Kuhlmeier to the circumstances in Morse.157 The Court also ob-
served that the precedent established by the Tinker and Fraser
decisions did not necessarily cover the particular concern to pre-
vent drug abuse at issue in Morse. 158 As Justice Scalia aptly noted
in his concurring opinion, the majority instead added another ex-
ception to the Tinker standard. 15 9
Regardless of whether the holding in Morse borrowed from ear-
lier precedent or established an additional exception, the Court
miscalculated in its interpretation of Frederick's banner as pro-
moting illegal drug use and consequently appropriately subjected
to restriction. The assertion that the phrase "Bong HiTS 4 Jesus"
advocates illicit drug use and is thus capable of being restricted
without violating the First Amendment is suggestive of a position
which leaves limits on further restriction of speech amorphous.
This position is dangerous because it leaves open the possibility
for further restrictions as long as a school official reasonably be-
lieves that certain student expression advocates the use of illicit
substances. School officials as well as instructors are surely de-
voted to the laudable goal of shaping the moral and cognitive
minds of today's youth. However, it is a mistake to overlook the
possibility that the responsibility for the order of a large group of
teenagers can inevitably and frequently result in quick and swift
decision- making, which occasionally is not grounded in reason-
ableness for First Amendment purposes.
In Morse, the Court concluded that it was reasonable for a
school official to believe that the ambiguous phrase on Frederick's
154. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 262.
155. Id. at 273.
156. Id. at 270.
157. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. at 2618, 2627 (2007).
158. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629.
159. Id. at 2636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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banner promoted illegal drugs. 160 The Court based this conclusion
on its reasoning that the phrase could be interpreted in at least
two distinct ways which demonstrated that it advocated the use of
illegal drugs. 161 First, the court proposed that the phrase "Bong
HiTS 4 Jesus" could be perceived as an instruction to take bong
hits, or as Morse suggested, "smoke marijuana." 162 Alternatively,
the Court indicated that the banner could be viewed as a celebra-
tion of illegal drug use because it could be understood as proclaim-
ing that bong hits are a "good thing."'163 Additional support for the
Court's conclusion came from Morse's explanation for confiscating
the banner.164 When Morse saw the sign, she thought that the
reference to a bong hit would be widely understood by other stu-
dents as referring to smoking marijuana. 
165
Morse's belief that Frederick's banner would be widely under-
stood by other students as referring to illegal drug use is anything
but a reasonable belief. In fact, it is a cynical and pessimistic per-
ception of her student body and their extracurricular activities.
Morse provided no additional support for her belief that the ban-
ner was widely understood by the student body to mean what she
thought it to mean. The record displayed no evidence that illegal
drug abuse was a widespread problem at the school or testimony
from other students present at the function indicating that they
applied the same meaning to the banner as did Principal Morse.
If anything, Morse's interpretation of the banner was an irra-
tional assumption rooted in an "undifferentiated fear or apprehen-
sion of disturbance."'166 This fear was caused by the atmosphere
present while the students waited for the torch relay to pass.
There was a report in the record that not all of the students were
waiting patiently. 167 Some of the students began throwing coke
bottles and snowballs at each other while others got into fights. 68
This description suggested that the atmosphere at the time was on
the threshold of anarchy and the proverbial "last straw" for Morse
was Frederick unfurling his "Bong HiTS 4 Jesus" banner. In an
attempt to maintain order based on her fear that the chaos would
160. Id. at 2625 (majority opinion).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
164. Id. at 2624-25.
165. Id.
166. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
167. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2621.
168. Morse v. Frederick, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006).
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become utterly unbridled, Morse acted impulsively and directed
her energy into subduing an activity for which there was no basis
that it was contributing to the disruption. The totality of the cir-
cumstances resulted in Morse hastily concluding that a nonsensi-
cal banner said much more than it actually did. The Court sub-
scribed to this hasty conclusion and expounded with its own thin
interpretation that the banner contained hidden meanings while
acknowledging that the message was "cryptic."'169 As Justice Ste-
vens remarked in his dissenting opinion, "it takes real imagina-
tion to read a 'cryptic' message (the [majority's] characterization,
not [his]) with a slanting drug reference as an incitement to drug
use."
1 70
As the majority in Tinker noted, the type of fear which moti-
vated Morse's response is not enough to usurp the right to freedom
of expression. 171 The Constitution says that this fear must be sup-
pressed and the risk involved in expression that induces such ap-
prehension taken, because this is the sort of perilous freedom that
produces our national fortitude and the vigor of Americans.
172
Additionally, the suggestion that the message was widely under-
stood by the student body as advocating illegal drug use is an un-
necessary and unfounded cynical view of those students. Even if
some of the students did comprehend the reference, they would
recognize absurd advocacy when they see it, and "the notion that
the message on [the] banner would actually persuade either the
average student or even the dumbest one to change his or her be-
havior is most implausible."'173 As Justice Stevens noted in his
dissenting opinion, the fact that the majority believed that this
nonsensical banner advocated illegal drug abuse is indicative of
the novelty of its argument and evokes the possibility that "the
principle it articulates has no stopping point."1 74 In other words,
the majority's decision creates a slippery slope for one of the most
fundamental freedoms on which our culture thrives and continu-
ously evolves.
Charles Chulack
169. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
172. Id. at 508-09.
173. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
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